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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
M A R Y A N N T U R N E R , 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
D E P A R T M E N T O F E M P L O Y -
M E N T S E C U R I T Y A N D 
BOARD O F R E V I E W O F T H E 
I N D U S T R I A L COMMISSION 
OF U T A H , 
Defendants. 
Case No. 
13395 
PLAINTIFFS BRIEF 
N A T U R E O F T H E CASE 
Plaintiff is claiming that Section 35-4-5 (h) of the 
Utah Employment Security Act, which limits eligibility 
for employment compensation during pregnancy, is in 
violation of both the Utah and United States Constitu-
tions. 
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D I S P O S I T I O N M A D E O F T H E CASE 
I N T H E L O W E R COURT 
This is the first court hearing in this matter. The 
Department of Employment Security and Board of 
Industrial Review of the Utah Industrial Commission 
of Utah denied plaintiff employment compensation for 
twelve weeks preceding and six weeks following the 
birth of her child. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff requests that the statute, Section 35-4-
5(h) , be declared unconstitutional and void both under 
the Utah and United States Constitutions. Plaintiff 
further requests that the Department of Employment 
Security be ordered to pay unemployment compensa-
tion for which Mrs. Turner would otherwise have been 
eligible during the period twelve weeks preceding and 
six weeks following the birth of her child. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
The agreed statement of facts stipulated to by 
plaintiff and defendants in this case pursuant to Rule 
75(0) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are as 
follows: 
The plaintiff duly filed a proper claim for unem-
ployment benefits, had sufficient base period wage 
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credits and was otherwise eligible, except for the preg-
nancy disqualification at issue in the case. 
The plaintiff was separated involuntarily from her 
work on November 3, 1972 for reasons unrelated to 
pregnancy. She was pregnant at the time, however, and 
the expected date of the birth of her child was estab-
lished by her doctor as June 6, 1973. In application of 
Section 35-4-5 (h), Utah Code Ann., 1953 she was dis-
qualified by the Department of Employment Security 
on March 22 1973 from receiving unemployment bene-
fits for a period beginning March 11, 1973, twelve 
weeks preceding the expected date of childbirth, and 
continuing for six calendar weeks after the date of 
childbirth. The disqualification was affirmed by the 
Appeals Referee on April 19, 1973, and by the Utah 
Board of Review on June 25, 1973. 
After filing her claim for unemployment benefits 
the appellant worked intermittently on call as a clerical 
worker for a manpower service. 
A R G U M E N T 
I. SECTION 35-4 5(h), UTAH CODE ANN., 
1953, IS VOID U N D E R A R T I C L E I, SECTION 
2 A N D A R T I C L E IV, SECTION 1 OF T H E 
C O N S T I T U T I O N O F U T A H . 
I. SECTION 35-4-5(h), UTAH CODE ANN., 
1953, IS VOID B E C A U S E I T IS A V I O L A T I O N 
3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
OF A M E N D M E N T 14 OF T H E U N I T E D 
S T A T E S C O N S T I T U T I O N . 
I. SECTION 35-4-5 (h), UTAH CODE ANN., 
1953 IS VOID U N D E R A R T I C L E I, SECTION 
2 A N D A R T I C L E IV SECTION 1 OF T H E 
C O N S T I T U T I O N O F U T A H . 
Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution of Utah 
states: 
All political power is inherent in the people; and 
al free governments are founded on their author-
ity for their equal protection and benefit, and 
they have the right to alter or reform their gov-
ernment as public welfare may require. (Em-
phasis supplied.) 
Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution of Utah 
states: 
The rights of citizens of the State of Utah to 
vote and hold office shall not be denied or 
abridged on account of sex. Both male and fe-
male citizens of the state shall enjoy equally all 
civil, political and religious rights. (Emphasis 
supplied.) 
The question of fair and equal treatment of all 
persons whether male or female is one of deep contro-
versy today. The issue of sex equality being one raised 
in the press and in public affairs generally. Utah faced 
and resolved the question of equal treatment for men 
and women at or before the time of statehood. As early 
as 1880 the Supreme Court of Utah in the case of F. 
M. Lyman v. Enoch F. Martin, 2 Utah Reports 136 
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(1877-1880) held that a provision requiring that men 
must be taxpayers to vote but women need not be was 
"obnoxious" to the equal protection requirements of 
the United States Constitution and struck the require-
ment that men must be taxpayers in order to vote. 2 
Utah 146. 
At the time of the Utah Constitutional Conven-
tion resulting in the Constitution of 1896 the issue of 
sexual equality was one of fierce and intense debate. 
The question arose again and again during the consti-
tutional debates. See, e.g. I Official Report of the 
Proceedings and Debates of the Convention Assembled 
at Salt Lake City on the Fourth Day of March, 1895 
to Adopt a Constitution for the State of Utah, 437-
601. Considering the great debate and thought given 
the issue it can be safely assumed that the two sections 
of the Utah Constitution referring to equal protection 
and equal political rights contemplated! full political and 
civil equality for women as well stated in Article IV, 
Section 1. Perhaps because of the express constitutional 
direction by which the government of the State of Utah 
has been governed for the last seventy-eight years Utah 
has not been visited by the bulk of litigation seeking to 
secure sexual equality under the law that has been seen 
in other states and at the federal level. 
Now the issue has arisen because of the statutory 
anomaly in the Unemployment Compensation Act 
which limits unemployment compensation available to 
women who are pregnant. 
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Section 35-4-5 (h) of the Utah Employment Secur-
ity Act is explicit. Regardless of her competence and 
immediate ability to work no woman may be eligible 
for unemployment compensation for twelve weeks pre-
ceding or six weeks following childbirth. This statute 
was applied as the sole basis for denying Mrs. Turner 
unemployment compensation for that eighteen week 
period in 1973. Mrs. Turner was able to work and did 
work on a part-time basis as a Kelly Girl temporary 
employee. (R. 17-18) There is no question in the minds 
of plaintiff or defendants that the only obstacle to 
paying Mrs. Turner the unemployment compensation 
was Section 35-4-5 (h) of the Utah Employment Se-
curity Act. H 
Plaintiff believes that the equal protection and 
equal civil rights section of the Utah Constitution make 
void this section of the Utah Code. Certainly plaintiff 
falls within the general scope of the unemployment 
compensation provisions of the Utah Employment Act. 
Section 35-4-2 of the act states its purposes. 
Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a 
serious menace to the health, morals and wel-
fare of the people of this state. Unemployment 
is therefore a subject of interest and concern 
which requires appropriate action by the legisla-
ture to prevent its spread and to lighten its bur-
den which now so often falls with crushing force 
upon the unemployed worker and his family. 
. . . The legislature, therefore, declares that in its 
considered judgment the public good, and the 
general welfare of the citizens of this state re-
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quire the enactment of this measure, under the 
police power of the state, for the establishment 
and maintenance of free public employment 
offices and for the compulsory setting aside of 
unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit 
of the unemployed person. 
Appendix A presents economic data showing the large 
interest women have in maintaining stable incomes of 
their own and the importance of those incomes to the 
State. 
Benefits are payable only to individuals who have be-
come eligible for such by contribution of his employer 
to the fund. Utah Employment Security Act, Section 
35-4-7. Benefits are paid in part in proportion to the 
amount contributed — that is, the amount of work 
performed by the potential recipient before unemploy-
ment. Utah Employment Security Act, Section 35-4-3. 
Other than the exemption for pregnancy and childbirth 
the conditions for eligibility for benefits all rest upon 
the applicant's refusal to work or, in the provision for 
discharge for misconduct, negligence and incompetent 
work. The causes for ineligibility, other than pregnancy 
and childbirth, are: 
1. Voluntarily leaving work. 
2. Discharge for misconduct. 
3. Failure to apply for or accept work. 
4. Strikes if the applicant is a member of a grade, 
class, or group of workers who were found to 
7 
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be party to a plan or agreement to foment a 
strike. 
5. Willful false statements concerning material 
facts relative to eligibility. 
6. Seeking or receiving benefits in another state. 
7. Registering at or attending an established 
school. 
8. Voluntarily leaving work for marriage unless 
the person so leaving has demonstrated the de-
sire to work and availability for work. 
9. When applicant is receiving wages in lieu of 
notice, dismissal or separation, vacation or term-
inal leave payment. 
The situation created by the statute is such that 
even if a woman is the financial support of the family 
and her income is requisite for the stability of the fam-
ily as referred to in the policy statement of the Act, 
even if she is completely capable or working, willing 
to work and actively seeking employment, the mere 
fact of the proximity of childbirth automatically rend-
ers her ineligible for unemployment compensation. 
The Utah Supreme Court has established a test 
for equal protection. In Justice v. Standard Gilsonite 
Company, 12 Utah 2d 357, 363 P.2d 974 (1961) this 
Court said that there must be a reasonable justification 
in fact for a law which provides penalties for some em-
ployers for failure to pay wages due and excludes banks 
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and mercantile houses from the penalty provision. In 
that opinion, written by Chief Justice Wade and con-
curred in by Justices Henroid and Callister with a 
concurring opinion by Justice Crockett the Court ap-
plied the reasonable basis test in a precise, factual way. 
Considering first banks and then mercantile houses the 
Court concluded that while there might be some factual 
dissimilarities between such employers and other em-
ployers they were not sufficient to render the purposes 
of the act inapplicable to banks and mercantile houses 
and thus the distinction was unconstitutional. In Jus-
tice Crockett's concurring opinion the rule is summar-
ized in a more general way. First, the classification 
must be uniform so that all who fall within the same 
class are effected alike. Pregnant women who are in 
the class of people ready, able and actively seeking 
work who have worked for a sufficient period to accrue 
benefits under the Unemployment Compensation Sys-
tem are not treated in the same way that other persons 
are. Second, Justice Crockett states the rules of classi-
fication must bear some reasonable relationship to the 
objectives sought to be accomplished by the statute. 
The objectives sought to be accomplished by the statute 
are to alleviate the economic burdens of unemployment 
and maintain the stability of the family and of the com-
munity. Certainly a family or a woman who is a head 
of a household is not given greater stability and ability 
to function in the community by being deprived of un-
employment compensation at the critical and expensive 
period surrounding the birth of a child. By the tests 
9 
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set out by the Court in Justice v. Standard Gilsonite 
Company, Section 35-4-5 (h) of Utah Code Ann., 1953 
is unconstitutional and should be declared void. 
In the case of possible denial of equal protection 
on the basis of sex, which this must be since only women 
can be declared ineligible under Subsection h, the Con-
stitution of Utah gives even more express instructions. 
Section 1 of Article IV of the Constitution provides 
both male and female citizens of Utah equal enjoyment 
of all civil rights and privileges. Whether a right or a 
privilege, unemployment compensation is a civil bene-
fit conferred by the state upon its citizens. Civil is 
defined by Black's Law Dictionary as pertaining or ap-
propriate to a member of a free political community or 
relating to the community or to the policy in govern-
ment of the citizens and subjects of the state. Civil 
right is more precisely defined as a right accorded to 
members of a district, community or nation. Again, the 
element necessary for a civil right or privilege is that 
it be conferred on the basis of membership in the com-
munity. The statutory protections and benefits granted 
by the Employment Security Act are conditioned upon 
the potential recipient's being a member of the com-
munity. I t is in the community's interest that those 
benefits be conferred. Section 1, Article IV of the 
Constitution is explicit. Those rights and privileges 
may not be extended unequally on the basis of sex. 
I I . SECTION 35-4-5 (h), U T A H CODE ANN., 
1953 IS VOID B E C A U S E I T IS A V I O L A T I O N 
10 
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O F A M E N D M E N T 14 O F T H E U N I T E D 
S T A T E S CONSTITUTION. 
After many years the federal courts have come to 
recognize the essential element of equal protection which 
was explicitly contained in the Utah Constitution in 
1896 and in decisions of the Utah Supreme Court for 
as much as 16 years prior to that. Discrimination in 
the application of state laws on the basis of sex is a 
basic violation of the elements of due process. Even 
excluding cases decided under the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U.S.C., Section 2000e-2, and the Equal Pay 
Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C., Section 206, the United States 
Supreme Court has come to accept the wisdom per-
ceived so many years ago by the Constitutional drafts-
men and Supreme Court Justices of Utah. 
In the case most directly useful for the consid-
erations of Mrs. Turner's situation the Supreme Court 
struck down provisions which established different proof 
requirements for servicemen and servicewomen seeking 
dependents pay for their spouses. In Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 36 L. Ed. 2d 583, 93 S. Ct. 
1764 (1973) Justice Brennan wrote an opinion which 
is a useful explication of the applicability of the 14th 
Amendment to laws having an unequal effect upon 
men and women. The statutes in question in Frontiero 
were statutes providing that uniform service members 
could obtain increased quarters allowances and medical 
and dental benefits for spouses claimed as dependent. 
37 U.S.C., Sections 401, 403 and 10 U.S.C. Sections 
11 
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1072, 1076. Under these statutes a serviceman may 
claim his wife as a dependent without regard to whether 
she is in fact dependent upon him for any part of her 
support. On the other hand, a servicewoman, in order 
to claim her husband as a dependent, must demonstrate 
that he is in fact dependent upon her for over one-half 
of his support. The Court struck down the statutory 
qualifications on treating husbands as dependents. Sev-
eral elements of Justice Brennan's opinion have a fam-
iliar ring to one who has read the Utah Constitutional 
provisions discussed in Point I of this Argument. The 
government argued that "As an empirical matter, wives 
in our society are frequently dependent upon their hus-
bands, while husbands rarely are dependent upon their 
wives." Thus, the matter of administrative conveni-
ence, relieving all husbands from the burden of show-
ing that their wives are financially dependent upon 
them for more than half of their income, saves admin-
istrative work and, presumably, pays dependents bene-
fits to a hopefully small number of wives who are, in 
fact, not financially dependent upon their husbands for 
over half their support. The same argument could 
apply to the unemployment compensation statute pres-
ently under consideration. Just as some wives may 
provide half or more of their own support, some women 
may be unable to work within twelve weeks before and 
six weeks following childbirth. But the administrative 
convenience of automatically excluding all women from 
access to these benefits cannot outweigh the constitu-
tional right to equal protection whether provided in the 
12 
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14th Amendment or the Due Process Clause of the 5th 
Amendment. As the Supreme Court said in Stanley v. 
Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 656, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551, 92 S. 
Ct. 1208 (1972): 
The Constitution recognizes higher values than 
speed and efficiency. 
If the argument supporting Subsection h of Sec-
tion 34-4-5 is that it is in the public benefit to support 
women's ineligibility for unemployment compensation 
the Equal Protection Clause bears even more heavily 
against the statute. The only effect Subsection h has is 
to deny a woman unemployment compensation during 
this period, She may still be, and to qualify under the 
Act must still be, ready, able and actively seeking em-
ployment. She is thus not encouraged to stay in the 
home, but penalized financially for her pregnancy at a 
time when economic stress upon the family must be 
greater than normal. No man would be denied unem-
ployment compensation on the basis that he was to 
become a father within twelve weeks or had become a 
father within the last six. The concept is absurd. Cer-
tainly there is no justification sufficient to satisfy the 
equal protection clause in penalizing a woman for her 
pregnancy. 
Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Reed v. Reed, 
404 U.S. 71, 30 L. Ed. 2d 225, 92 S. Ct. 251 (1971) 
provides another explication of the applicability of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to 
differences based upon sex. In the Reed case the stat-
13 
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ute in question was an Idaho statute giving preference 
in appointment as Administrator of an estate to any 
male candidate otherwise equally entitled to the posi-
tion with any female candidate. The Court held that, 
since women may be issued letters of administration 
for purposes of probate under circumstances where 
there is no male "otherwise equally entitled" that treat-
ing men and women, equally entitled to letters of ad-
ministration, differently solely on the basis of sex is a 
criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that stat-
ute. By analogy to the Turner situation if women were 
always denied unemployment compensation then deny-
ing a woman such compensation when she was close to 
term would not by itself be a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. 
However, the statute recognizes the need to pay unem-
ployment compensation to women who are qualified 
just as to men who are qualified. Singling out preg-
nancy as a basis for denying unemployment benefits is 
a process not reasonably related to the objective of the 
statute and thus is constitutionally defective. The hold-
ings of the Reed and Frontiero cases can best be sum-
marized in the language of Justice Pitney in S. S. Roy-
ster Guano Company v. Virginia, 233 U.S. 412, 415, 
64 L. Ed. 989, 990, 40 S. Ct. 560 (1920). 
[A classification] must be reasonable, not arbi-
trary, and must rest upon some ground of dif-
ference having a fair and substantial relation to 
the object of the legislation, so that all persons 
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike. 
In other words, the Supreme Court of the United 
14 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
States has adopted precisely the test adopted by the 
State of Utah in Justice v. Standard Gilsonite Com-
pany, 12 Utah 2d 357. 
One recent United States Supreme Court opinion 
appears, on its face, to weaken the long standing rule 
that the Equal Protection Clause applies to differing 
treatment by the state based upon sex alone. A Florida 
statute grants widows but no widowers, an annual 
$500.00 property tax exemption. A widower applied 
for the exemption but was denied because the statute 
provides the benefit only for widows. He sought de-
claratory judgment that the exemption was violative 
of the Equal Protection Clause because the classifica-
tion widow was based upon gender. The Florida Su-
preme Court found the classification valid because it 
had a fair and substantial relation to the object of 
the legislation, that is, the reduction of the disparity 
between the economic capabilities of a man and a 
woman. The Supreme Court, in the opinion Kahn v. 
Shevin, U.S , 40 L. Ed. 2d 189, 94 S. Ct. 
(1974) upheld the Florida Supreme Court. The 
basis of the split decision upholding the Florida 
Supreme Court was the women's earnings are, on the 
average, so much less than men's earnings that a sta-
tute designed to partially relieve this disparity by dis-
criminating in favor of a class of people otherwise dis-
advantaged was not in conflict with the Federal Con-
stitution. 40 L. Ed. 2d 193. The differences between 
the Kahn case and the case before this Court are clear. 
Denying unemployment compensation to a woman dur-
15 
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ing a portion of her pregnancy and shortly after term 
does not serve to alleviate an already existing inequity 
but, assuming all the statistics given in the Kahn case, 
exacerbates that inequity. See Appendix A. It may be 
that under the Utah Supreme Court interpretations of 
equal protection such favorable legislation would be 
invalid under the Utah Supreme Court. That issue is 
not before the Court today. Where a statutory dis-
crimination serves to magnify a defect in the social 
system, if any exists, it cannot possibly be justified on 
the basis of the Equal Protection Clause under Kahn 
or under any other interpretation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause whether that interpretation be state or 
federal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above stated, plaintiff Mary Ann 
Turner urges this court to declare Section 35-4-5 (h) 
of the Utah Code Ann., 1953 to be void as a violation 
of the Utah Constitution and the 14th Amendment of 
the United States Constitution and to order the De-
partment of Employment Security to pay Mrs. Turner 
those additional amounts of unemployment compen-
16 
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sation to which she would otherwise have been entitled. 
Respectfully submitted this day of August, 
1974. 
CONSTANCE K. LUNDBERG 
Cooperating Attorney 
UTAH CIVIL LIBERTIES 
UNION, NATIONAL 
ORGANIZATION FOR 
WOMEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
79 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-1234 
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APPENDIX A 
(UTAH - 1970) 
Employment status 
and occupation 
Women as 
percent 
Total Women Men of total 
Civilian population 676,854 351,008 325,846 51.9 
In civilian labor force 399,162 145,638 253,524 36.5 
Employed 378,562 136,988 241,574 36.2 
Unemployed 20,600 8,650 11,950 42.0 
Not in labor force 277,692 205,370 72,322 74.0 
Source: U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census; 
"Census Population: 1970. General Social and Economic Char-
acteristics, PC(1)-C46." 
Refers to persons 16 years of age and over. 
W O M E N W O R K E R S I N U T A H , 1970: 
Nearly 8,700 women workers were unemployed in 1970, 
creating a 5.9 percent unemployment rate. The rate 
for men was 4.7 percent. 
Two-fifths of all mothers of own children under 18 
years of age were in the labor force in 1970, and these 
mothers represented 44 percent of the female work 
force. Almost 39,000 mothers with children 6 to 17 
years of age only, or 53 percent of all such mothers in 
the population, were in the labor force. Nearly 25,000 
mothers with children under 6, or 29 percent of those in 
the population, were workers. 
About 20,000 families (8 percent of all families) were 
headed by women. More than half (52 percent) of the 
5,804 women family heads with related children under 
6 were workers. About 3,500 women with children under 
6 headed families where incomes were below the poverty 
level; 35 percent of these women were workers. 
(From the March 1974 Bulletin of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor, Employment Standards Administra-
tion, Women's Bureau, Washington, D.C. 20210.) 
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